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ABSTRACT
Should the manufacturer of a product be held legally responsible when a consumer, while using the
product, harms someone else? We show that if consumers have deep pockets then manufacturer
liability is not economically efficient. It is more efficient for the consumers themselves to bear
responsibility for the harms that they cause. If homogeneous consumers have limited assets, then the
most efficient rule is "residual-manufacturer liability" where the manufacturer pays the shortfall in
damages not paid by the consumer. Residual-manufacturer liability distorts the market quantity when
consumers' willingness to pay is correlated with their propensity to cause harm. It distorts product
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1.  Introduction 
Should the manufacturer of a product be held legally responsible when a consumer, while 
using  the  product,  harms  someone  else?    Manufacturers  might  be  held  liable  for  accidental 
harms caused by the consumer, such as when a lawnmower flings a stone that hits a neighbor in 
the eye or when a driver of a car hits a pedestrian.
2  Manufacturers might also be held liable if 
the consumer intentionally caused harm, for example when a gun is used to commit murder.  
Indeed, recently many lawsuits have been brought recently against firearms manufacturers for 
the  deaths  and  injuries  caused  by  criminals  who  use  guns.    Although  such  lawsuits  have 
generally  been  unsuccessful,
3  these  issues  remain  hotly  discussed  in  the  legal  and  political 
arenas.
4 
We consider a model of a dangerous product supplied by a perfectly competitive market.  
The product’s use has some tendency to harm others -- either accidentally or intentionally -- and 
both the manufacturers and the consumers can take actions to reduce the likelihood of the harm.  
For example, gun owners can take greater care while handling and storing their guns to avoid 
accidental shootings and can refrain from committing crimes; likewise, gun manufacturers can 
make investments in safety features such as mechanical gun locks (reducing the likelihood that a 
                                                 
2 See Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 447 N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. App. 1983) (lawnmower) and Houvenagle v. 
Wright,  340  N.W.2d  783  (Ia.  App.  1983)  (automobile).  Lawsuits  involving  other  products  such  as 
alchohol, pesticides, cigarette lighters, and computer games abound.   
3 Exceptions involve situations where the consumer accidentally injured someone as a result of a product 
malfunction.  If a car’s brakes fail, for example, the pedestrian may be able to recover from the 
manufacturer provided that the brake failure is not the consumer’s fault.  However, if the product 
functioned as it was designed to, or if the consumer deliberately inflicted the injury, courts have 
traditionally refused to hold the manufacturer liable. 
4 A number of lawsuits are pending in federal and state courts in which the plaintiffs seek to relax or 
bypass the traditional rule immunizing manufacturers from deliberately inflicted harms.  State and federal 
legislatures have responded by attempting to codify the manufacturers’ immunity from liability.  For 
example, two bills in Congress, H.R. 1036 and S. 696, would "prohibit civil liability actions from being 
brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers or importers of firearms or ammunition 
for damages resulting from the misuse of their products by others."  The former bill has made it through 
the U.S. House of Representatives while the latter is pending in the U.S. Senate.   3 
child inadvertently shoots a sibling) or can refrain from producing highly lethal products, such as 
armor-piercing bullets.  
We  show  that  consumer  liability  is  more  efficient  than  manufacturer  liability  when 
consumers have deep pockets and can pay for the harms that they cause; solvent consumers fully 
internalize the social risks associated with their product use.  This has three desirable effects.  
First, consumers take the optimal degree of care when using dangerous products.  Second, they 
demand optimal safety features in the products that they buy.   Third, the equilibrium market 
quantity is efficient because the market price plus the consumer' s expected liability reflects the 
true social cost of the dangerous product.
5 
On the other hand, manufacturer liability may be more efficient when consumers lack the 
financial resources to pay for the harms that they cause.  In a representative-consumer setting, we 
show that it is more efficient for the consumer to bear primary responsibility for the damages 
while manufacturers are held responsible for the shortfall not covered by the consumer.  We call 
this  rule  "residual-manufacturer  liability."    Although  consumers  take  inadequate  precautions 
when using risky products,
6 this rule gives manufacturers the correct incentive to design and 
produce safer products and insures that the market price reflects the manufacturers’ expected 
future liability, leading to the efficient market quantity.
7   
Importantly, we show that residual-manufacturer liability may distort market outcomes 
when  consumers  are  heterogeneous.    Residual-manufacturer  liability  leads  to  quantity 
distortions, for example, when the consumers'  elasticity of demand is systematically correlated 
with the social harm that they  cause.   If safe  consumers are more price sensitive than their 
                                                 
5 See Hamada (1976). This may not be true if consumers misperceive risks (Spence, 1977).  
6 Shavell (1986) formalizes the so-called "judgment-proof problem.”   
7 Shavell (1980) showed that the higher price leads to a more efficient market quantity but did not discuss 
residual-manufacturer liability or the heterogeneity issues discussed here.     4 
harmful counterparts, then residual-manufacturer liability may depress the market quantity so 
much that society as a whole is better off imposing liability on the consumers alone.
8  Residual-
manufacturer  liability  may  also  lead  to  quality  distortions.    If  consumers  have  private 
information about their heterogeneous financial assets, for example, then the solvent consumers 
purchase excessively safe products in equilibrium.  Again, it may be more efficient to impose 
liability on the consumers alone than to hold manufacturers liable. 
The  issues  raised  here  are  distinct  from  those  in  the  large  literature  that  focuses  on 
product injuries to consumers themselves.  Simply put, product injuries to consumers are largely 
internalized in well-functioning markets (Hamada, 1976; Landes and Posner, 1985 and 1987).
9  
Even  without  manufacturer  liability  imposed  by  law,  consumers  would  be  willing  to  pay  a 
premium for safer products that reduce their personal risk and to use risky products prudently.  
Consequently, the economic arguments for products liability for consumer injuries have focused 
on situations involving transactions costs and market imperfections.  Manufacturer liability for 
consumer injuries may  be efficient, for  example, when consumers misperceive product  risks 
(Spence, 1977; Epple and Raviv, 1978; Polinsky and Rogerson, 1983) or when manufacturers 
have private information about the safety of their products or take unobservable actions that 
affect product safety (Daughety and Reinganum, 1995 and 1997).
10 
Section 2 highlights the optimality of residual-manufacturer liability in a representative 
                                                 
8 Previous legal commentators (Note, 1995a and 1995b) have argued in favor of manufacturer liability for 
gun misuse. With the exception of Hay' s (1999) informal analysis, the quantity distortion issue has been 
unaddressed in the literature.  
9 Consumers and manufacturers jointly absorb the costs of injuries (with the allocation depending upon 
the contract struck between them) and therefore have a joint incentive to take optimal precautions.  Early 
descriptive work includes Calabresi (1961) and McKean (1970).  
10 The issues here are reminiscent of vicarious liability (Sykes, 1998; Mattiacci and Parisi, 2002), holding 
employers  liable  for  the  negligence  of  their  employees,  for  example.    Our  problem  differs  in  that 
employers exert some supervision over their employees and can discharge unsatisfactory employees. 
Manufacturers, on the other hand, typically cannot control how their products are used after the sale.   5 
consumer framework. Section 3 shows that residual-manufacturer liability can distort the market 
quantity  in  an  example  where  consumers  have  heterogeneous  demand  curves  and  harm 
propensities.  Section 4 shows that residual-manufacturer liability can distort product safety in an 
example where consumers are privately informed about their wealth levels.  Section 5 concludes.  
All proofs are given in the appendix. 
 
2.  The Basic Framework 
We begin with the case of a representative consumer purchasing a harmful product from 
a perfectly competitive market.  The probability that a single unit of the good will cause an injury 
is  ) , ( y x p , where  0 ³ x  is the manufacturer' s investments in product safety and  0 ³ y  is the 
consumer' s precaution level.  Product safety is perfectly observable to the consumer at the time 
that he makes his purchase decisions. The manufacturers have identical constant-returns-to-scale 
production technologies with marginal production cost x (we normalize the other production 
costs to zero).   We assume that  ) , ( y x p  is decreasing in each argument, is strictly convex, and 
that  -¥ =
®




p  and  -¥ =
®





11  This last condition implies that the marginal 
return from the first dollar of investment is arbitrarily large. 
When  injured,  the  third  parties  suffer  damages  0 > d .    Consumers  are  said  to  be 
insolvent or "judgment-proof" when their future assets, w, are insufficient to cover d.
12    In 
contrast to the consumers, manufacturers are assumed to have deep pockets.  The representative 
consumer receives a marginal benefit  ) (q P  from consuming the q
th unit of the good.  This is the 
                                                 
11  pi(x,y) is the derivative with respect to argument i = x, y. 
12 Note that the price that the consumers pay ex ante is not deducted from their future wealth.  This is 
quite realistic when injuries are low probability events. Similar results would be obtained if consumers 
have deep pockets but there is a low probability of being held responsible for the damages.   6 
inverse demand curve net of any liability concerns.  
Social welfare is given by:
13 
￿ - - - =
q
0
dz ] y x d ) y , x ( ￿ ) z ( P [ ) q , y , x ( S .            (1) 
The first-best market outcome, x
*, y
*, and q
*, are the values that maximize this expression.  The 
competitive market chooses these values privately, of course, in the shadow of future liability. 
We consider the general class of strict liability rules,  } , {
m c d d , that allocates damages  w
c £ d  to 
the  consumer  and 
m d   to  the  manufacturer.
14    We  also  highlight  two  specific  rules.    With 
consumer-only liability the consumer pays for third-party damages to the point where his or her 
financial  assets  are  exhausted,  } w , d min{ ￿
c =   and  0 =
m d .    With  residual-manufacturer 
liability the manufacturer is held legally liable for the shortfall in damages,   } , min{ w d
c = d  
and } , min{ w d d
m - = d .  
Manufacturers  compete  by  offering  price-safety  pairs  to  attract  the  representative 
consumer.  The manufacturers are the "leaders" (so to speak) choosing price and product safely 
first while the representative consumer is a "follower," subsequently choosing his quantity and 
precautions.  In equilibrium, consumer surplus is maximized subject to three constraints:   




} x , p {
dz ] p y ￿ ) y , x ( ￿ ) z ( P [ Max             (2) 
                                                 
13 While our notation naturally reflects accidental harms the framework is also valid for intentional 
harms, including crimes.  Even criminals can take actions to reduce unnecessary losses (collateral 
property damage, injuries and deaths) while engaging in criminal activities and can spend effort searching 
for non-criminal alternatives (getting a job, going to school).  Criminals may also borrow or steal guns 
from consumers; liability gives consumers the incentive to safeguard their firearms.  The proper treatment 
of the criminal' s utility in the social welfare function is debatable, of course, and not addressed here.   
14 Note that this class does not include rules where the liability depends on the precautions taken by the 
manufacturer and the consumer.  Negligence rules are discussed in the conclusion.  We are implicitly 
assuming that only one injury can occur for a given consumer.  This is justified if injuries occur with a 
random arrival rate and economic activity ceases after the first one.    7 
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The  first  constraint  reflects  that  the  consumer  chooses  his  precautions,  y,  to  minimize  the 
expected private cost associated with product use.  The second constraint says that the consumer 
consumes to the point where his marginal value of consumption is exactly offset by his expected 
unit cost.  The final inequality constrains manufacturers to earn non-negative profits.   
 
Proposition 1:  When the representative consumer is fully solvent then consumer-only liability 
achieves the first-best market outcome.   
 
  When the representative consumer pays in full for the damages that he causes he will 
invest optimally in precautions to avoid harming others.  Furthermore, the consumer is willing to 
pay a premium to manufacturers for optimally safe products and the competitive market delivers 
exactly what he wants.  Finally, the consumer purchases the socially optimal quantity because his 
unit cost reflects the full social cost: the sum of the marginal cost of production, the cost to the 
consumer of taking precautions, and the expected damages to third parties.   
  Next,  suppose  that  consumers  are  insolvent.    The  first-best  outcome  is  clearly  not 
achieved with consumer-only liability.  Since the consumer bears less than full responsibility for 
the harms he causes he will take too few precautions to avoid harming others.  Since products are 
designed with only the consumer’s preferences in mind, manufacturers will underinvest in safety 
features.    Finally,  the  consumer  purchases  too  much  of  the  product  as  his  unit  cost  of 
consumption falls short of the true social cost.   8 
 
Proposition 2:  When the representative consumer has limited financial assets then residual-
manufacturer liability is optimal within the class of strict liability rules.   
 
  It is unavoidable that consumer precautions fall short of their first-best levels, but putting 
primary responsibility on the consumer at least pushes his precautions in the right direction.  
Putting  residual  responsibility  on  the  manufacturer  leads  the  market  price  to  reflect  the 
manufacturer' s  share  of  the  expected  future  damages  in  addition  to  the  production  cost.  
Consequently, the consumer' s unit cost will fully reflect the social cost of the risky product and 
so the market quantity is socially optimal.  Finally, this rule leads the manufacturers to invest 
efficienty in product safety. Intuitively, this happens because the manufacturer and the consumer 
together are jointly responsible for the full social harm to third parties. 
  Other  policy  instruments,  such  as  taxation  and  mandatory  insurance  policies  for 
consumers,  will  perform  well  on  some  --  but  not  all  --  dimensions.    These  alternative 
instruments, if carefully chosen, will achieve the efficient market quantity.  They will not by 
themselves  get  consumers  to  take  additional  care  or  manufacturers  to  implement  socially 
desirable safety features, however.  Taxes would need to be coupled with other instruments -- 
regulations or negligence-based liability rules perhaps -- in order to mimic all of the benefits of 
residual-manufacturer liability. 
  The  basic  model  can  be  extended  in  number  of  ways  without  changing  the  basic 
conclusion.  The results hold in situations where consumers themselves are harmed in addition to 
the third parties.
15 They also hold when the harms to others stochastic rather than deterministic. 
                                                 
15 The working paper version of this paper, available on SSRN, includes consumer harm.  This feature has 
been dropped to streamline the exposition.     9 
The framework could be easily extended to include non-financial sanctions, such as criminal 
penalties for careless or malicious product use.  While useful, these supplements would not 
generally achieve the first-best: the combined threat of civil and criminal liability is generally 
insufficient to induce efficient behavior.  Finally, the framework could be extended to situations 
where product safety features interfere with product use, diluting the value that the consumer 
derives from the product.
16 
  The  optimality  of  residual-manufacturer  liability  is  maintained  with  some  forms  of 
consumer heterogeneity.  Importantly, the representative consumer' s inverse demand curve  ) (q P  
can be easily reinterpreted as representing a continuum of consumers who differ in the value they 
place  on  consuming  a  single  unit  of  the  good.    Residual-manufacturer  liability  is  socially 
efficient so long as the different consumer types all have the same wealth level and the same 
propensity to cause social harm, h.   The next two sections highlight why residual-manufacturer 
liability may be undesirable when these other forms of heterogeneity are introduced.  
 
3.  Quantity Distortions: Heterogeneous Harm Levels 
This section allows consumers to differ from one another in both their price sensitivities 
and in the social harms that they cause to third parties.  We show that residual-manufacturer 
liability can distort the market quantity when these parameters are correlated in the consumer 
population.    Indeed,  residual-manufacturer  liability  may  create  such  large  distortions  in  the 
market quantity that it would be more efficient to have no manufacturer liability at all.  
  We  make  two  simplifying  assumptions  here  in  order  to  focus  attention  on  quantity 
                                                 
16 The framework could be extended to consider imperfect competition.  Residual-manufacturer liability would 
clearly change market prices in this case, too, although the change may not be efficient.  Additional work on these 
issues is needed.   10 
distortions.  First, neither the manufacturers nor the consumers can affect the probability of 
injuries to others,  0 y x = = .  Second, consumers are assumed to be totally insolvent following 
these injuries,  0 w = .  We extend the earlier framework to allow for two types of customers, i = 
H, L.  We will refer to these two types as the "harmful group" and the "safe group," respectively. 
The expected social harm of a single unit of the product in the hands of a type i consumer is 
i i i d ￿ ￿ =  and we assume that  0 > D > D L H .  The inverse demand curve of type i consumers is 
) (q Pi  and the corresponding demand curve is  ) (p Di .  We assume that it is impossible for 
manufacturers to distinguish between the two types of customers and therefore cannot engage in 
price discrimination. 
An all-knowing social planner would, of course, set different prices for the two groups of 
consumers, but this is infeasible given our assumptions.  The appropriate benchmark has the 
social planner setting a single price for both groups.  This second-best price must reflect the 
social harm associated with the sale of one additional unit, or the marginal social harm:
17  
) ( ) (
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With  residual-manufacturer  liability,  the  competitive  equilibrium  price  reflects  the 
manufacturer' s expected liability associated with a sale of one unit, or the average social harm:
 18 
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When the average and marginal harms values diverge, residual-manufacturer liability distorts the 
                                                 
17  Suppose  that  price  falls  so  that  exactly  one  more  unit  is  sold.    With  probability 
)] ( ) ( /[ ) (
* * * p D p D p D L H H ¢ + ¢ ¢  the additional unit is sold to a type H consumer, and with probability 
)] ( ) ( /[ ) (
* * * p D p D p D L H L ¢ + ¢ ¢  it is sold to a consumer of type L.  Multiplying these probabilities by the 
associated social harms,  H D  and  L D gives the expression. 
18 The total social harm  ) ( ) ( p D p D L L H H D + D  divided by the total quantity  ) ( ) ( p D p D L H + .   11 
equilibrium market quantity.     
 
Proposition 3:  If the harmful consumer group has a more elastic demand curve than the safe 
consumer group then the market quantity under residual-manufacturer liability is higher than the 
second-best quantity.  If the harmful consumer group has a less elastic demand curve then the 
equilibrium market quantity is lower than the second-best quantity.   
 
Suppose that the harmful consumer group has a more elastic demand curve than the safe 
consumer group. When the market price rises, the percentage of harmful consumers who leave 
the  market  is  larger  than  the  percentage  of  safe  consumers  who  leave.    It  follows  that  the 
marginal purchaser (i.e. the consumer who is indifferent between buying the gun and not buying 
the gun at the going price) is more likely to be a harmful consumer than the average purchaser in 
the  market.    Since  residual-manufacturer  liability  effectively  "taxes"  manufacturers  for  the 
average  social  harm  the  market  price  will  be  inefficiently  low  and  the  market  quantity 
inefficiently high.  Conversely, when the harmful consumer group has a less elastic demand 
curve then when the market price rises the safe consumers leave the market at a higher rate than 
harmful consumers. The marginal purchaser is more likely to be a safe type than the average 
purchaser.  In this case, manufacturers are "over-taxed" with residual-manufacturer liability.  
 
Proposition 4:  When the harmful consumer group has a more elastic demand than the safe 
consumer  group  then  residual-manufacturer  liability  is  more  efficient  than  consumer-only 
liability.    When  the  harmful  consumer  group  has  a  less  elastic  demand  then  residual-
manufacturer liability may be more or less efficient than consumer-only liability.   12 
 
  Residual-manufacturer  liability  can  have  disastrous  consequences  when  the  harmful 
consumers are less price sensitive than their safe counterparts.  The consumers who cause the 
least social harm are the first to drop out of the market when the market price rises while the 
consumers who cause the most social harm are the ones more likely to remain.  Consumer-only 
liability may be more efficient because it keeps the safe consumers in the market. 
This may be seen in a simple numerical example.  Suppose there is a population of 
consumers,  each  of  whom  demands  at  most  one  unit  of  the  good.    Each  unit  costs  $10  to 
produce.  Suppose that 99% of the population causes no harm but 1% causes harm of $300.  
Furthermore,  suppose  that  the  safe  consumers  value  the  product  less  than  the  harmful 
consumers:  vL = $12.99 and  vH = $310.01.   Both  types  of  consumer  "should"  purchase  the 
product in this example: 99% of the population creates a surplus of $2.99 while 1% of the 
population creates a social value of a penny.  With consumer-only liability, competition drives 
the price down to p = $10, the marginal cost of production.  The socially optimal outcome is 
obtained: all consumers -- safe and harmful alike -- buy the product.  Now consider residual-
manufacturer liability.  If both types of consumer purchased the product the price would be p = 
$13, above safe consumers'  valuation of $12.99.  So the safe consumers would be driven from 
the market and the price would subsequently rise to p = $310, the marginal cost, $10, plus the 
expected social harm caused by harmful types, $300.  Only the harmful 1% of the population 
purchases the product, and, for these harmful consumers, the "social surplus" is just a penny.  
Social welfare has obviously fallen.
19 
 
Proposition 5:    Suppose that the variance in the population' s harms grows while holding the 
                                                 
19  If the social surplus for the unsafe consumers were negative then the market would disappear.   13 
average harm constant at price
R p .  If the harmful consumer group has a less elastic demand 
curve than the safe consumer group then consumer-only liability becomes more efficient relative 
to residual-manufacturer liability.  
 
  When the two consumer types are equally harmful, residual-manufacturer liability clearly 
dominates consumer-only liability on efficiency grounds (indeed, it achieves the second-best 
market outcome; see Proposition 3).  When the variance in harms grows, however, then residual-
manufacturer liability diverges from the second-best and becomes relatively less efficient.  The 
proposition holds social welfare under residual-manufacturer liability fixed (by holding average 
harm  constant  at  p
R)  and  performs  the  comparative  static  on  consumer-only  liability.  
Alternatively, one could hold social welfare fixed under consumer-only liability and show that 
residual-manufacturer  liability  becomes  relatively  less  efficient  although  this  is  less 
straightforward to prove. 
  Our analysis has restricted attention to two specific liability rules: residual-manufacturer 
and consumer-only liability.  Social welfare would of course be higher if the social planner could 
fine-tune the rule.  Damage multipliers would be valuable supplementary instrument to residual-
manufacturer  liability,  for  example.    The  optimal  multiplier  would  be  less  than  one  when 
consumers  with  less  elastic  demands  cause  more  social  harm,  effectively  lowering  the 
manufacturers’ liability to reflect marginal harm.  Similarly, it would be greater than one when 
the less elastic consumers cause less social harm.  Alternatively, the social planner could impose 
a direct tax on the manufacturers reflecting the marginal social harm of the activity.  These 
policies  would  of  course  require  that  the  court  understand  a  host  of  market  characteristics 
including the nature of demand curves, harm levels, and correlations, etc.  They would also   14 
compromise the positive impact manufacturer liability has on product design. 
 
4.  Quality Distortions: Heterogeneous Financial Assets 
  This section introduces a second kind of consumer heterogeneity: heterogeneous financial 
assets.    Proportion  q   of  the  consumer  population,  the  "type  0"  consumers,  are  completely 
insolvent following an injury ( 0 0 = w ).  Proportion  q - 1  of the consumer population, the "type 
1" consumers, are fully solvent ( d w > 1 ).  Finally, we assume that the probability of harm is 
additively  separable  in  manufacturer  and  consumer  precautions,  0 ) , ( 12 = y x p .
20    We  will 
characterize incentive-compatible pairs of product offerings,  } , { 0 0 x p  and  } , { 1 1 x p , where the 
insolvent consumers select the former  and the solvent consumers select the latter.  The pair of 
product offerings is a competitive equilibrium if no manufacturer can earn positive profits by 
deviating to a different price-safety combination.  Finally, the equilibrium is said to be pooling 
when  } , { } , { 1 1 0 0 x p x p =  and separating otherwise.  
  As  before,  we  focus  on  two  basic  liability  rules.    With  consumer-only  liability  the 
damages are paid by the consumer when he is fully solvent and go uncompensated otherwise, 
} 0 , { } , { 1 1 d
m c = d d  and  } 0 , 0 { } , { 0 0 =
m c d d . With residual-manufacturer liability the damages are paid 
by the consumer when he is fully solvent but are paid by the manufacturer if the consumer is 
insolvent,  } 0 , { } , { 1 1 d
m c = d d and  } , 0 { } , { 0 0 d
m c = d d .   
 
Proposition 6:  With consumer-only liability, the solvent consumers’ purchasing decisions and 
precautions are at their first-best levels.  The insolvent consumers purchase unsafe products, take 
                                                 
20 This implies that a consumer' s choice of precautions is independent of product safety features.   15 
too few precautions, and consume too much.    
 
  As  in  Section  2,  the  insolvent  customers  do  not  care  enough  about  safety  and  the 
competitive  market  gives  them  exactly  what  they  want:  a  cheap  and  relatively  dangerous 
product.  They subsequently put in too little care to avoid harming others and overconsume the 
product.  The fully solvent consumers, on the other hand, are held personally accountable for any 
third-party damages and therefore demand safer products from the manufacturers and use them 
prudently.  In short, the competitive market supplies the solvent consumers "efficiently."   
 
Lemma 7:  Suppose the consumers'  types are observable and price discrimination is feasible. 
With residual-manufacturer liability, all consumers purchase optimally safe products.  The price 
paid  by  the  solvent  consumers  reflects  marginal  production  costs  only  while  the  insolvent 
consumers  pay  a  premium  that  reflects  the  manufacturer’s  future  liability.    Conditional  on 
product safety and consumer precautions, efficient market quantities are obtained. 
 
  This  full-information  benchmark  may  be  understood  intuitively.    Solvent  consumers 
demand optimally safe products because primary liability forces them to internalize the social 
harms  they  cause.    Insolvent  consumers  do  not  personally  internalize  the  harm,  but  the 
manufacturers supplying them are forced to internalize the harm through residual-manufacturer 
liability (as in Section 2).  The solvent consumers pay ex post for the harm that they cause while 
the insolvent consumers pay ex ante through a higher market price.   
  This benchmark is not sustainable when the consumer are privately informed.  Since the 
insolvent consumers pay a higher price than their solvent counterparts the insolvent consumers   16 
would obviously pretend to be solvent in order to secure the lower price. In other words, the full-
information benchmark is not incentive compatible.   
 
Proposition  8:    Suppose  that  consumers'   types  are  private  information.    With  residual-
manufacturer liability a pooling equilibrium does not exist. There does exist a unique separating 
equilibrium when the proportion of insolvent consumers, is not too small.  The fully solvent 
consumers purchase excessively safe products and the insolvent consumers purchase optimally 
safe products.  Conditional on the precaution levels, the efficient market quantities are obtained.   
 
  A  detailed  proof  is  given  in  the  appendix,  but  the  main  ideas  may  be  understood 
intuitively.  If a pooling equilibrium did exist, the market price would have to be inflated to 
reflect the manufacturers'  liability associated with the insolvent consumers.  Consumers who are 
solvent face primary liability for third-party harm and therefore place greater weight on product 
safety than their insolvent counterparts.  A clever manufacturer could skim off these safety-
sensitive consumers in the following way: offer a safer product at a price that only the solvent 
consumers would prefer.  The manufacturer would avoid future liability  himself  and earn  a 
positive profits. 
  This intuition is applicable in understanding the separating equilibrium as well.  The 
market supplies a product with optimal built-in safety features to the insolvent consumers who 
pay  for  manufacturers'   future  liability  up  front  through  an  inflated  price.    If  the  solvent 
consumers purchased this product, too, they would effectively have to pay twice for liability: 
once up front through the market price and then later on when a third party suffers damages.  But 
the competitive market supplies the solvent consumers with a very different product -- a safer   17 
product at a higher price.  This ultra-safe product is priced "fairly" -- the solvent consumers are 
only paying the manufacturing costs and so their purchase decisions are efficient given the safety 
measures. -- but the safety measures themselves are inefficiently high. When q , the proportion 
of insolvent consumers, is small then a competitive equilibrium fails to exist.  The reason is 
simple: a clever manufacturer could profitably deviate from the separating equilibrium and offer 
a product with socially optimal safety features and a relatively low price that both consumer 
types would prefer.   
This  Proposition  is  analogous  to  Rothschild  and  Stiglitz' s  (1976)  famous  result  that 
competitive insurance markets may have no equilibrium.   Many authors have suggested changes 
to Rothchild and Stiglitz’s timing to restore the existence of equilibrium.  Riley (1979) proposed 
a dynamic adjustment process where firms could modify their product offerings in light of a 
deviation.  The separating equilibrium described above is a so-called "Reactive Equilibrium" 
when q  is low as well.  The idea behind this is that if a deviator did indeed make an offer that 
both types of consumer preferred, then another firm could react to this deviation and skim off the 
solvent consumers.
21  (A similar logic was used to break the pooling equilibrium.) 
 
Proposition 9:  If the proportion of insolvent consumers is above a cutoff then the separating 
outcome  with  residual-manufacturer  liability  is  more  efficient  than  the  equilibrium  with 
consumer-only  liability.    If  the  proportion  of  insolvent  consumers  is  below  the  cutoff  then 
consumer-only liability is more efficient.   
 
                                                 
21 The robustness of the separating equilibrium for low q  is sensitive to the particular dynamic process, 
however.  Indeed, Wilson (1977) restored the existence of a pooling equilibrium in Rothschild-Stiglitz by 
allowing the non-deviating firms to withdraw, but not modify, their offers in light of a deviation.  These 
extensions, and other refinements, are surveyed in Riley (2001).   18 
  From Proposition 6, consumer-only liability achieves the first-best outcome for solvent 
types while the insolvent types over-consume unsafe products and take too little care while using 
them.  Residual-manufacturer liability, on the other hand, distorts the product safety supplied to 
the solvent customers in the separating equilibrium (Proposition 8).  It follows that consumer-
only  liability  is  more  efficient  when  there  are  sufficiently  many  solvent  consumers  in  the 
population but not when the population is dominated by insolvent consumers.   
 
5.  Conclusion  
There are sound economic reasons to hold manufacturers liable for the injuries that their 
products cause to non-consumers.  Since consumers typically cannot be held responsible for 
100% of the harms that they cause, placing liability on consumers alone will lead to the over-
consumption  of  products  with  inadequate  safety  features.    In  a  representative-consumer 
framework,  the  most  efficient  strict  liability  rule  holds  the  consumer  liable  for  third-party 
damages up to the point that their financial assets allow, and then holds the manufacturer liable 
for  the  shortfall  in  damages.
22    However,  when  consumers  are  heterogeneous,  residual-
manufacturer liability can lead to undesirable distortions in the market quantities and product 
safety features.   
The formal analysis in this paper ignored the costs of the legal system and assumed that 
victims were automatically compensated for their losses.  Holding manufacturers liable would 
only make practical sense if the shortfall in damages not paid by consumers (and the associated 
benefit of residual-manufacturer liability) was large enough to justify the added expense and 
transactions costs associated with the litigation process.  Additional problems would arise if 
                                                 
22 The asymmetry in the treatment comes from the assumption that consumers observe product attributes 
at the time of purchase but manufacturers cannot observe or control consumer care.   19 
overly-sympathetic juries grant astronomical jury awards, chilling the economic activity.   
Taxes may be a viable alternative to residual-manufacturer liability.
23  The optimal tax, 
which would reflect the marginal social harm, could be imposed on either the manufacturers or 
the consumers.  Although taxation may have lower transactions costs than residual-manufacturer 
liability, it has several important drawbacks.  First, the planner would require both the time and 
the ability to fine-tune the taxes on a market-by-market basis.  Second, a tax by itself would 
provide inadequate incentives for manufacturers to design safer products.   A negligence rule that 
holds manufacturers liable if their safety features fall short of acceptable levels -- or regulations 
geared at product safety directly -- may prove useful supplements to taxation.   Note, however, 
that  liability  has  the  advantage  of  putting  responsibility  for  safety  in  the  hands  of  experts.  
Manufacturers are likely to be better informed about the feasibility of product modifications than 
regulators. 
Forcing consumers to purchase insurance policies when they own dangerous products is 
another possibility.  This may suffer from the same problems as residual-manufacturer liability.  
If  insurance  providers  cannot  discriminate  among  the  different  types  of  consumers  then  the 
competitive insurance premiums would reflect the average rather than the marginal harm and the 
market quantity would be distorted.  Furthermore, in the absence of manufacturer liability and 
other regulations product safety regulations, manufacturers would have insufficient incentives to 
produce safer products.
24   In this way, mandatory insurance has the same problems as taxation. 
The results of this paper raise the natural question -- and concern -- about where the chain 
of corporate responsibility should end.  The model assumed a single manufacturer, but harmful 
activities will often involve multiple products and multiple suppliers.  Guns, for example, are 
                                                 
23 See Carlton and Loury, 1980 and Hamilton, 1998, for discussions of Pigouvian taxation and liability. 
24 Indeed, one can interpret manufacturer liability as bundling the product with an insurance policy.     20 
especially dangerous when they are loaded with bullets.  Should the ammunition manufacturer be 
held liable for deaths and injuries as well?  Timothy McVeigh created the bomb that destroyed 
the  Oklahoma  City  Federal  Building  by  loading  a  mixture  of  fertilizer  with  diesel  fuel  -- 
purchased  at  a  Conoco  service  station  --  into  a  rented  Ryder  truck.    Should  the  fertilizer 
manufacturer, Conoco and Ryder all be held responsible for the 168 lives that were lost?
25  These 
issues remain fruitful for further research. 
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7.  Appendix 
 
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2:  As a benchmark, suppose a social planner chooses x, q, and 
c d .  
The consumer chooses y to minimize his expected costs:  y ￿ ) y , x ( ￿
c + .  Our earlier assumptions 
guarantee  that  this  y  is  positive  and  unique.    Implicitly,  ) , (
c x f y d =   where  0 ) , ( >
c x f d d .   
Holding x fixed, if   d
c < d  ( d
c > d ) then the consumer under-invests (over-invests) relative to 
what a social planner would do.  The most efficient liability rule is  } , min{ w d
c = d .  Substituting 
into (1), the social planner would choose x and q  to maximize: 
  ￿ - - -
q
dz w d x f x d w d x f x z P
0
})] , min{ , ( })) , min{ , ( , ( ) ( [ p  . 
 The benchmark solution satisfies 
}) , min{ , ( })) , min{ , ( , ( min arg
* * w d x f x d w d x f x x
x
+ + = p , 
}) , min{ , (
* * * * w d x f y = ,  
* * * * * * * * * * ) , ( ) ( y x d y x q P + + = p . 
 
Claim: The competitive equilibrium is the benchmark,  } , , { } ˆ , ˆ , ˆ {
* * * * * * q y x q y x = , if and only if 
} , min{ w d
c = d  and  } , min{ w d d
m - = d  . 
Proof  of  claim:    Inequality  (5)  clearly  binds, 
m y x x p d p ) , ( + = .      Substituting  this  and 
) , (
c x f y d =  into (2) and (4) gives an equivalent program: 
  ￿ - - + -
q
0
c c m c
x
dz )] ￿ , x ( f x ) ￿ ￿ ))( ￿ , x ( f , x ( ￿ ) z ( P [ Max               
s.t.   ) ￿ , x ( f x ) ￿ ￿ ))( ￿ , x ( f , x ( ￿ ) q ( P
c m c c + + + =  
Using the envelope theorem we find the competitive equilibrium  } ˆ , ˆ , ˆ { q y x  satisfies  
) , ( ) ))( , ( , ( min arg ˆ
c m c c
x
x f x x f x x d d d d p + + + = ,   
) , ˆ ( ˆ c x f y d = ,  
y x y x q P
m c ˆ ˆ ) )( ˆ , ˆ ( ) ˆ ( + + + = d d p .      23 
} ˆ , ˆ , ˆ { q y x   =  } , , {
* * * * * * q y x   with  residual-manufacturer  liability.    With  d
c = d   and  0 =
m d , 
} , , { } ˆ , ˆ , ˆ {
* * * q y x q y x = .   
 
Proof  of  Proposition  3:     
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
) ( ) (
p D p D
p D p D
p D p D
p D p D
L H
L L H H
L H
L L H H
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  if  and  only  if   
) p ( D ) p ( D ) p ( D ) p ( D L H L H ¢ < ¢ .  Dividing both sides by  ) ( ) ( p D p D L H  and multiplying by  p -  
shows this is equivalent to  ) ( ) ( p p L H e e < .  This orders the prices under residual-manufacturer 
liability and the benchmark.  The order of the quantities follows. 
 
Proof  of  Proposition  4:    With  consumer-only  liability,  the  price  0 =
C p .    When 
) ( ) ( p p L H e e > then 
C R p p p > > * ; when  ) ( ) ( p p L H e e < then 
C R p p p > > * .  The result follows 
from the quasiconcavity of social welfare. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  Holding the average harm, 
R p , fixed in equation (7) we may define  L D  
as a function of  H D :  ) ￿ ( ￿ H L  where 
) (














.  Social welfare with consumer-
only  liability  ( 0 p
c = )  may  be  written  ￿ - + ￿ -
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Differentiating with respect to  H D  and substituting the derivative of  ) ￿ ( ￿ H L  gives 
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- - .                   
This is positive if  ) p ( D / ) p ( D L H  is increasing in price or equivalently  ) ( ) ( p p L H e e < . 
 
Proof  of  Proposition  6:    Suppose  perfect  price  discrimination  is  possible.    It  follows  from 
Proposition 1 that the solvent consumers will be efficiently supplied,  x1 = x
* and y1 = y
*.   For 
the insolvent consumers the market outcome is x0 = y0 = 0.   The market price is p1 = 
* x  for the 
solvent consumers and p1 = 0 for the insolvent consumers.  Incentive compatibility is satisfied so 
this is also the equilibrium with incomplete information.   24 
 
Proof of Lemma 7:  For the solvent consumers, residual-manufacturer liability is equivalent to 
consumer-only liability so by Proposition 1 they are supplied efficiently.   From the proof of 
Propositions 1 and 2, the insolvent consumers take zero precautions  0 0 = y and manufacturer 
precautions satisfy  x d x x
x
+ = ) 0 , ( min arg 0 p .  Therefore 
*
0 x x =  and 
* *
0 ) 0 , ( ) ( x d x q P + = p , the 
efficient levels. 
 
Proof of Proposition 8:  Suppose a pooling equilibrium,  } ˆ , ˆ { x p , does exist and let qˆ  be the 
proportion of insolvent types.  Zero-profits implies  d ) 0 , x ˆ ( ￿ ￿ ˆ x ˆ p ˆ + = .  Consider a deviation to  
} ￿ x ˆ , ￿ p ˆ { } x ~ , p ~ { + + = .    The  insolvent  consumers  prefer  } ˆ , ˆ { x p   to  } ~ , ~ { x p   and  the  solvent 
consumer  prefers  } ~ , ~ { x p   to  } ˆ , ˆ { x p   when  d )] y , ￿ x ˆ ( ￿ ) y , x ˆ ( ￿ [ ￿ 0
* * + - < <   .    The  deviator 
receives  positive  profits  when  x p ~ ~ >   or    p x ˆ ˆ - + > e r .      Substituting  for  p ˆ   gives 
d ) 0 , x ˆ ( ￿ ￿ ˆ ￿ ￿ - > .  When e  is sufficiently small then this condition is satisfied for any  0 > r .  
 
Claim:  In  any  separating  equilibrium,  } , { 1 1
R R x p   and  } , { 0 0
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0 + > .  By deviating to  } , { 0 0
R R x p r -  a manufacturer 
could profitably capture the type 0 market.  (If he attracts the solvent consumers too, all the 
better.)      Suppose  that 
R R x p 1 1 > .    The  incentive  compatibility  constraint  for  the  insolvent 
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0 x x =  . 
Proof of claim:   } , ) 0 , ( { } , {
* * *
0 0 x d x x x p p + =  is the outcome with perfect price discrimination.  
If  } , { 0 0
R R x p   did  not  have  this  form,  then  a  deviator  would  steal  the  entire  type  0  market 
} x , ￿ p { 0 0 +  (if the type 1 consumers accept, too, all the better for the deviator.)  
   25 
Claim:  d x x x
R ) 0 , (
* *
1 p + =  . 
Proof of claim:  Given the two claims proved earlier, the IC constraints for the two types are: 
(IC0):   
R x d x x 1
* * ) 0 , ( £ +p , 
(IC1):    d ) y , x ( ￿ d ) 0 , x ( ￿ x d ) y , x ( ￿ x
* * * * * R
1
R
1 + + £ + . 
(IC0) implies that 
*
1 x x
R > .  If (IC0) were slack, then the type 1 consumers could be made better 
off by lowering 
R x1  closer to 
* x .  If (IC0) binds then (IC1) is slack.      
 
Claim: When q  is sufficiently large there is no unilateral deviation that both types would prefer. 
Proof of claim:  Suppose  } ~ , ~ { x p  is preferred by both types and let  q
~
 be the proportion of 
insolvent types at that deviation. Positive profits for the deviator implies  d ) 0 , x ~ ( ￿ ￿
~
x ~ p ~ + ³ .  The 
deviation  is  preferred  by  the  insolvent  consumers  when 
R p d x x p 0
* * ) 0 , ( ~ = + £ p .      Taken 
together,  we  have  d x x d x x ) 0 , ( ) 0 , ~ (
~ ~ * * p p q + £ + .    When  1 = q   then  1
~
= q   as  well,  so  this 
inequality is only satisfied when  } , { } ~ , ~ { 0 0
R R x p x p =  .  We have  already seen that the type 1 
consumers would prefer  } , { 1 1
R R x p , a contradiction.  Continuity completes the proof.   
 
Proof of Proposition 9:  Let 
j
i S  be the social welfare associated with liability regime j for a 
representative  consumer  of  type  i.  Consumer-only  liability  is  preferred  if 




0 S ) 1 ( S q q - + ,  or  ) ( ) )( 1 ( 0 0 1 1




1 S S >   because  solvent 
consumers are served efficiently under consumer-only liability (Proposition 6) but not under 
residual-manufacturer liability (Proposition 8).  
C R S S 0 0 >  because manufacturers supply efficient 
safety features to the insolvent consumers under residual-manufacturer liability and the market 
quantity is optimal.  The result follows. 
 